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Abstract—Automation and robotics are two enablers for de-
veloping the Smart Factory of the Future, which is based
on intelligent machines and collaboration between robots and
humans. Especially in final assembly and its material handling,
where traditional automation is challenging to use, collaborative
robot (cobot) systems may increase the flexibility needed in
future production systems. A major obstacle to deploy a truly
collaborative application is to design and implement a safe
and efficient interaction between humans and robot systems
while maintaining industrial requirements such as cost and
productivity. Advanced and intelligent control strategies is the
enabler when creating this safe, yet efficient, system, but is often
hard to design and build.
This paper highlights and discusses the challenges in meet-
ing safety requirements according to current safety standards,
starting with the mandatory risk assessment and then applying
risk reduction measures, when transforming a typical manual
final assembly station into an intelligent collaborative station.
An important conclusion is that current safety standards and
requirements must be updated and improved and the current
collaborative modes defined by the standards community should
be extended with a new mode, which in this paper is refereed to
the deliberative planning and acting mode.
Index Terms—Human-robot Interaction, HRI, HRC, deliber-
ation, safe interaction, operator education and training, safety
standards, ISO/TS 15066.
I. INTRODUCTION
Installations of industrial robots are increasing globally
every year [1], especially the use of collaborative robots
(cobots) in small and medium enterprises. This is probably due
to the benefit of easy to use and install as well as a reduced
initial automation investment [2].
In the final assembly at an automotive factory, assembly
stations are crowded with operators, product parts and tools,
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and the assembly process is often complex and in many cases
hard to automate using traditional industrial robots. One reason
is that these installations require necessary safety solutions
including fences, which makes the combination of human
and robot operations challenging. Therefore, there is a great
interest in introducing automation in the form of collaborative
robot systems where collaborative robots could help to relieve
the human from the heavier and more laborious tasks and
to free up his/her time for more value adding operations
[3]. Although despite both industry and research are keen to
develop the associated technologies with collaborative robots
[4], cobots are underused [5]–[7] and are mostly deployed
as traditional robots but without fences [8], mainly for han-
dling tasks. They are not really used for collaboration as a
true coworker, intelligent and collaborative, where they can
increase both flexibility and quality.
Based on a previous study by the authors [9], where a
manual assembly station was transformed into an intelligent
collaborative automation system, the following requirements
were identified for cobot systems:
1) The interaction between a cobot system and humans
require that they can work side by side, co-actively or
collaboratively, in a safe and efficient manner.
2) The cobot system must be fully aware of the human
intention and adapt its behavior intuitively, while the
human can access and understand system intention and
information immediately without being distracted.
3) Smart tools that can be used by both humans and co-bot
systems are needed to enable flexibility and robustness
by interchangeability.
4) Managing variability, both of the product and the re-
sources and their abilities, is required while planning
and also in the control system.
5) The communication and control system must be able
to coordinate and control autonomous cobot systems as
well as humans, whilst guaranteeing safe, efficient, and
robust control, continuously re-plan the work.
Although all the requirements above are important when
implementing intelligent and collaborative robot system, safety
is a top priority. Manufacturers, integrators and users of robotic
systems are required to ensure that the use of the system meets
the available directives, standards and international specifi-
cations, where the harmonized standards play an important
role in clarifying and specifying how to meet the safety
requirements.
Based on the manual assembly station from the previous
study [9], this paper focuses on the safety aspects of the
intelligent cobot station with the goal of ensuring human safety
while also achieving efficiency and flexibility. The possibilities
and limitations of the available standards is evaluated in the
paper by trying to use them during the design of the station.
First, the mandatory risk assessment is performed for the
station design and several possible risks are identified. Based
on these risks, the proposed collaboration modes in current
standards and specifications, are applied, trying to reduce
the risks. However, the collaborative modes proposed by the
standards do not differ notably from traditional automation and
limit true intelligent robot human interaction. To improve the
usefulness of the standards and specifications, we identified
the need of a new mode, the deliberative planning and acting
mode, to enable a deliberative interaction between human and
robot system.
In the next section, the current safety standards are intro-
duced. In Section III, the use case station is presented together
with a description of the new collaborative station. The risk
assessment of the collaborative station is presented in Section
IV and in Section V, the need for extended standards for
intelligent collaborative systems is discussed.
II. REGULATION, SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND
STANDARDS
There are many definitions of the relationship between hu-
mans and robot system, Wang et al. [10] classified them in four
types, which are partly overlapping the nested classification
suggested by De Luca et al. [11]:
• Coexistence is the simplest one when human and robot
work side by side without overlapping other’s workspace.
• Interaction occur when robot and human share the same
workspace and communicate to complete a task in se-
quential order, without necessarily coordination of actions
or intentions.
• Cooperation is possible when the parties have their own
autonomy and strive to complete their task while sharing
some of their resources.
• Collaboration goes further then the types mentioned al-
ready, is when human and robot directly interact, commu-
nicative or physical way, share intentions and coordinate
to complete a complex task.
Depending on what type of relationship a specific operation
has, the safety considerations will vary, which has an impact of
the current standards. Robotic safety Standards are divided into
three types. Type A provides general requirement for safety of
machinery. Type B provides generic safety requirements and
type C which provides more specific safety requirements have
the highest priority and include references to type A and B
standards.
The following standards are relevant and applicable for the
type of automation system we are dealing with in this research:
• ISO 12100, Safety of machinery — General principles
for design — Risk assessment and risk reduction [12].
• ISO 10218-1, Robots and robotic devices — Safety
requirements for industrial robots — Part 1: Industrial
Robots [13]. This part is intended for those who develop
and manufacture the robot itself and its controller.
• ISO 10218-2, Robots and robotic devices — Safety re-
quirements for industrial robots — Part 2: Robot systems
and integration [14]. This part is aimed for those who
integrate the robot system, including the robot, the end-
effector and other equipment, devices products necessary
to perform the required process.
• ISO/TS 15066, Robots and robotic devices – Collabora-
tive robots [15]. This part supplements and builds upon
the industrial robot safety standard ISO 10218. It provides
additional guidance on design and risk assessment for
collaborative robot application connected to the collabo-
rative operation methods as well as defines biomechanical
limits for power and speed limiting HRC applications.
The specification is expected to become a standard in the
near future [16].
According to the above safety standards and specifications,
risk assessment is mandatory for all robotic applications. Its a
comprehensive process that usually engage several stakehold-
ers, from the integrator who is responsible for conducting the
risk assessment, to the operator who will use the robot system.
The process is iterative and begins with hazards identification,
estimation and analysis of their severity and ends up with risk
reduction.
According to ISO 12100 a risk is a function of its severity
degree and the probability that the risk occurs. The probability
is divided into three parts: how many people are affected,
the occurrence of the risk and the opportunity to avoid or
to limit the damage. Risk reduction principles in the standard
are prioritized according to how effective they are at reducing
risk. The most demanding approach is to reduce risk through
inherently safe design. This is to be achieved by designing
the risk so that it no longer exists. Second, the most diffi-
cult approach is to reduce the risk by providing protection,
safeguarding, which prevents the risk from occurring or by
protective measure to mitigate the risk so that it does not have
the same serious consequences. If the two methods above are
not possible to apply or an unacceptable risk remains, the last
alternative is to inform about the risks, to train operators and
staff, to use personal protective equipment and to warn where
Fig. 1. Four Collaborative modes according to ISO 10218:2011, from Villani
et al. [4]
the risk exists by setting up symbols in and/or around the area.
For collaborative applications additional risk may arise
when robot and operator work side by side and share
workspace. Therefore it is very important to eliminate the haz-
ards and reduce the risks in the design phase by establishing
the limits, the access and the clearance of the collaborative
workspace, and ergonomics and human interface with the
robotic system. According to ISO/TS 15066, task definition
and task transition between collaborative and non-collaborative
operations need to be carried out and be combined with the
identified hazards related to robots, robot system and the
application itself. Moreover, ISO/TS 15066 give clarification
and guidance on how to apply one or a combination of several
of the following collaborative operation modes, see Figure 1
from Villani et al., [4] to meet safety requirement and risk
reduction when designing a collaborative application:
Safety Monitored Stop - This mode is used in applications
where the robot system and human need to work side-by-side
or to access the collaborative workspace, but not simultane-
ously. It is based on the robot system reaching a ”protective
stop” (Stop category 2 - a controlled stop with power left to the
machine actuators) before an operator enters the collaborative
area. The robot remains still until the operator leaves the area
then it may resume automatically. Some collaborative robots
are featured with motion limitation and function to achieve
protective stop, but even traditional industrial robots can be
used with complementary safety devices such as a safety
camera or light curtain that monitor the workspace for any
human entrance.
Speed and Separation Monitoring - This mode is an en-
hancement of the simpler Safety Monitored Stop mode where
both operator and robot can act concurrently in the collab-
orative area. An area can be divided into a safe, a warning
and a stop zone where the robot may move at higher speed
when the operator remains in the safe zone, slow down
when in the warning zone or stop when the operator is the
stop zone. The robot (or external safety equipment) shall be
equipped with safety-rated speed monitoring functions, safety-
rated stop monitoring functions and safety-rated soft-axis and
space limiting functions.
Hand Guiding - Is used when the operator needs to re-
program robot paths or position on the fly. It allows to
transmit motion commands to the robot system via a hand-
operated device. This mode requires that the robot is equipped
with safety-rated stop monitoring to ensure the safety of the
operator entering the collaborative area and safety-rated speed
monitoring to ensure that the robot is moved in a controlled
speed where no additional hazards are introduced.
Power and Force Limiting - This mode is the ”most”
collaborative mode where the robot and the operator can have
physical contact intentionally or unintentionally. It requires
the robot system to have a passive and inherently safe design
such as smooth surfaces and that the robot (or external safety
equipment) is equipped with an active safety-related control
system such as sensitive force monitoring functions that can
dissipate collision forces and that do not violate determined
force limits. Detailed information about guidance on force,
speed, separation distance, biomechanical and contact limits
and how to measure these can be found in ISO/TS 15066.
III. THE USE CASE
The use-case in this paper is a manual assembly station
from a truck engine final assembly line. The engines are
transported from station to station in a predetermined time
slot on Automated Guided Vehicles (AGV), controlled by a
factory control system, where the engine is set to a certain
position and height. The material to be mounted on a specific
engine are loaded by an operator from kitting facades located
adjacent to the line, see Figure 2. The kitting cart is manually
pushed from the kitting area to the station and attached to
the AGV just in time, where it will follow the AGV until all
parts are consumed. Another operator is guided by instructions
displayed on a screen to perform typical assembly tasks that
require human precision and flexibility.
In the chosen station, the operator has to mount a heavy
metal lock (ladder frame) on top of the engine, see Figure 2,
insert several pipes, enter and tighten a large amount of bolts,
and mount and tighten three oil filters, by using different tools
that are suspended from the ceiling. The station is designed in
a way that everything is within reach for the operator in a safe
and ergonomically way. These kind of manual operations are
monotonous and sometimes hard to finish within the dedicated
time. Therefore the operators from adjacent stations can help
each other in completing the all tasks within the cycle time.
Many tasks of the use case station are hard to automate and
need an operators’ excellent capability of performing flexible
operations, such as pick and place of small part of different
variants, tweaking and twisting pipes to get them in place, or
keeping cables in order to connect them in tight spaces on the
engine. However, to automate some of the operations would
be beneficial from an ergonomic, flexibility, and quality per-
spective. To be able to automate the manual station, traditional
Fig. 2. Line layout with kitting area adjacent to mainline(left). The use case station where the operator is mounting the ladder frame on top of the engine(right)
Fig. 3. Part of the operations performed sequentially by operator on the
station
robots is not possible to use due to the restricted station space
as well as the need to keep an operator, making this station
a good use case for introducing collaborative robots. Some of
the operations of use-case station was identified as suitable
for collaborative or coexistence operations, and is shown in
Figure 3.
A. The collaborative station
The conceptual layout for the transformation of the station
can be seen in Figure 4. To increase flexibility an UR10e
robot from Universal Robot, it is mounted on an autonomous
mobile robot and operates at one side of the AGV that holds
the engine, while the operator perform his/her task from the
other side. With this separation, a natural barrier is obtained
between robot and operator. The kitted material is transported
just-in-time to the station by an Autonomous Transport Robot
(ATR), which parks on the short side of the AGV to enable
both the robot and the operator to reach the material.
To avoid unclear interaction between operator and robot, the
station uses traditional visible marked boundaries (yellow and
black stripes) on the floor to visualize the restricted area of
the station for both active resources in the station, the robot
system and the operator, and for other passive persons who
may be near the station. The robot system has a predefined
track to follow (blue dots) when entering and leaving the
station boundaries.
An important aspect in the design was to design a solution
that enable interchangeability between operator and robot so
that in case the robot fails, the operator can replace the robot
and finishes the task. Therefore the tools are adapted to be
used both by the robot as well as the operator and wired from
the ceiling right above the engine.
Fig. 4. The collaborative robot station of the use case
B. Station tasks
High level planning operations to be performed on the
station are described below, and are also shown using a
Sequence of operations(SOP) graph [17] in Figure 5, incl.
allocation of tasks on robot (with prefix R), on operator(with
prefix O) or on both robot and operator (with prefix O//R) as
well as the dependency between operations can be listed out.
for example: the operation TightenBoltss has a precondition
RobotReadyToTighten that must be fulfilled before the opera-
tion can be executed and when it is completed, post condition
TightenBoltsLeftDone is updated.
1) The station cycle time begins when the precondition
AGVReady is true and the AGV with the engine is at
a predetermined position according to station configura-
tion. Then, the operation ParkATR and ParkMobilRobot
can be executed. Already when the robot comes to the
station, it has an LFtool attached. Now the pick and
place ladder frame operation can be executed by the
robot together with the operator. A control algorithm
adapts to the operator’s ability to first lift and then
navigate the heavy plate and place it on top of the
engine.
2) It is only when the ladder frame is positioned on the
engine and post conditioning LFOnEngine is fulfilled,
that the operator proceeds with his operation PickAnd-
PlacePipes, while the robot de-attaches from the LFtool
and attaches to the nutrunner.
3) When the pre condition PipesOnEngine is fulfilled, the
operator can execute PickAndEnterBolts. The robot can’t
execute TightenBolts before the pre condition Nutrun-
nerReady and BoltsOnEngine are True. O* indicates that
operator can execute the operation in case the robot fails
or malfunctions.
4) When the robot is finished with TightenBolts on left
side, the robot can continue with TightenBolts on right
side, while the operator execute PickAndPlaceOilFilters
to keep the cycle time.
5) When the pre condition TightenBoltsRightDone becomes
true, the robot de-attaches from the nutrunner and at-
taches to the oil filter tool and proceed with executing
TightenOilfilters, while the operator perform a quality
check.
Fig. 5. Sequence of operations for the collaborative station
C. Iterative design
The design of the cobot station presented above, was in
reality designed during multiple iterations together with the
risk assessment. This iterative process started with the re-
quirements related to the product, process and resources, when
defining the application limitations and the conceptual layout.
Consideration have been taken for what resources should
and could perform the various operations for assembling
the product and its variants, what components needed to be
included and what resources e.g. tools, robots or operator
needed to have the capabilities to perform the required tasks.
In addition, which operator/engineer should have access to
the station, what type of training and education is required
and who is allowed to modify the configuration of the station.
An important step was to define the collaborative area bound-
ary and division between collaborative and non-collaborative
tasks and dedicated operator/robot work-space in the station.
However, since these design decisions is not the focus of this
paper, the motivation of each design decision is left out of this
paper due to brevity.
IV. RISK ASSESSMENT
Based on the station design presented above, several hazards
that may occur during the interaction between human and
robot system was identified during the risk assessment. Some
of the hazards are listed in Table I where a description of
the hazard, each corresponding consequence, the level of
collaboration, what related operations, and relevant performer
are given.
For the level of collaboration, interaction and collaboration
is used as defined in Section II, but a new human-robot relation
is also used, called Coordination: human and robot system
share a workspace and they communicates and coordinates
their action and intention to complete a sequence of task.
Hazard 1 in Table I, is a common challenge for any type
of automation system, where a hardware failure (or control
error) make a robot drop what it is carrying, but can have
greater consequences if it happens during a true collaborative
operation. This failure can cause e.g. the heavy ladder frame
to overturn on the operator’s body or legs and injure him.
Hazard 2 may occur when the robot and the operator share
a workspace and execute their tasks in parallel, when e.g. a
sensor failure makes the robot change its path unintentionally
and hits the operator.
Hazard 3 is common if the control sequences are complex.
It can happen in the case when the operator is picking
and entering the bolts and the robot is tightening the bolts
sequentially. If the sequence of the operator and the robot is
not synchronized it may lead to that some steps are being
missed, and that the robot tool may hit the operator while
he/she is stressing to enter the bolts. Hazard 4 is similar to
hazard 2 but is initiated by the operator who may not be
aware of the robot state, which then moves in a direction not
anticipated by the operator, probably due to communication




No Hazard Consequence Level of collaboration Operations Performed by
1 Robot loses grip on the heavy Lad-
der frame and drops it
Crushing Collaboration Pick and place
ladderframe
Robot and operator
2 The robot does something unex-
pected and collides with the oper-
ator
Stroke to upper body Interaction Any robot opera-
tion
Robot
3 The tool can hit the operator while
he/she pick and place the bolts
Sqeeze hands Coordination Tighten bolt, pick
and place bolt
Robot
4 Operator unaware of system status
and unintentionally comes in the
way of the robot.
Collision Interaction Any robot opera-
tion
Robot
5 The robot fails to attach to the
oil tool and the operator wants to
correct without signaling
Collision Interaction Tighten oil filter,
troubleshooting
Robot
The final hazard 5, is another type of challenge since it
relates to troubleshooting situations. It can occur e.g when
the robot fails to attach to the oil filter tool, due to changed
tool position and the robot stops. The operator may step in
and try to correct without communicating with the system and
suddenly the robot starts to move and collide with the operator.
A. Risk reduction
Next step is to assess the identified risks, determining if
the risk level is acceptable or additional measures needs to
be taken to control the hazards, reduce them or remove the
unacceptable ones. The assessed criteria are: severity of injury
(s1, s2), frequency of exposure to the risk (f1, f2) and the
possibility of avoiding the risk (p1, p2).
The outcome of the assessment is the required performance
level (PLr) that the individual safety functions or safety
measures, needed for minimising the identified risks, must
comply with. In our application one or more identified hazard
had the parameter severity of injury = serious(s2), frequency
and duration of exposure to the risk = frequent and long
time of exposure (f2) and possibility of avoiding the risk
= possible under specific conditions (P1). Accordingly the
resulted required performance level is PLr = d which is the
second highest level, see Figure 6
Fig. 6. Required performance level
For Collaborative robot systems, risk reduction is achieved
through application design and workspace division (instead
of separating human and robots by safeguards), and meeting
the specific safety requirements and/or measures of one or a
combination of the four collaborative operation modes defined
by the standards.
To reduce risk 1, it is possible to use both a mechanical
safety design of the gripper and safety I/O with safety PLC
that limits the actuation of the gripper when necessary. To
reduce the other risks, we can possibly use several of the
”built in safety” functions inherently designed in the robot
UR10e [18] that comply with requirements specified by the
four standards collaborative modes. The idea is that power
and force limiting will always be active to reduce clamping
and pressure exerted by the robot to reduce the risk level in
case of collision between the robot and operator as in hazard
2 and 3. In those cases if any limit is exceeded a protective
stop will be generated. In addition, to reduce hazard 3, speed
limitation, safety-related soft axis and space limitation and
TCP force and speed limitation can be applied, to ensure low
speed of the robot while close to the operator, which can also
make the operator feel more secure
In case of unintentional collision as for hazard 4, torque
limiting can be used as well, to reduce high transient energy
and impact forces. Hazard 5 is harder to handle, despite that
the aforementioned functions are active, since the risk is still
big enough if the operator is acting fast and is not aware of
the system state and what is next robot sequence.
The disadvantages with these safety measure implementa-
tions are the limitation of speed of the robot, the use of safety
zones, protective stops that need to be manually reset before
resuming, etc, that makes the station very inefficient.
B. Collaborative modes
Apparently by using the aforementioned collaborative meth-
ods, by using a collaborative robot (UR10e) equipped with
several safety functions, built-in force/torque sensor, config-
urable stopping time and stopping distance and by monitoring
different parameters as speed and force, it seems that the
majority of the risks can be reduced.
However, it is impossible to apply all these limiting strate-
gies while meeting efficiency, flexibility and productivity re-
quirements. The current collaboration modes of the standards
and best practises can never enable the creation of a station that
is safe and that can handle a large product variability, mov-
ing and exchangeable resources, handle errors and automatic
recovery and online planning. We therefore suggest a new
collaboration mode called Deliberation in planning and acting,
that can support safe collaborative stations with intelligent and
autonomous robot system that can include advanced control
strategies.
V. DELIBERATION IN PLANNING AND ACTING
Fig. 7. Deliberation in planning and acting mode
In the deliberative planning and acting mode, represented
in Figure 7 the operator and the robot system share the
workspace, responsibilities, intentions, and they deliberate
throughout the execution to reach an agreement of the plan
for achieving a specific goal in an efficient and safe way. In
order to implement this type of collaborative mode, the main
component is a control system that can support the deliberation
and that can execute the robots and other resources operations
according to the agreed plan in a safe way [19]. However,
some features from the other collaboration modes can be in-
cluded, like adaptive power and force limiting functions, speed
limiting functions, restricted zones and monitoring sensors.
A central requirement for this mode is that the operator
should have a good understanding of the system and have
received education and training to be able to operate in
the workplace. The operator should be highly involved in
designing the workplace, like defining sequence of operation,
and he/she should have good knowledge of all resources
capabilities to perform the different operations. Therefore it
is very important that the robot system starts its operations by
controlled access of a qualified operator.
A prerequisite for such a workplace is that an intuitive and
bidirectional interface should be in place to enable efficient
handshaking and checking, to indicate continuously the tran-
sition between the different collaborative tasks and to avoid
erroneous action by either party. In case of changes to the
plan, the operator and the robot system have to consult and
deliberate with each other, via the intelligent human-in-the-
loop control system [20], before changing the agreed plan.
If the robot system anyway makes an undesired motion or
action, the adaptive safety function should be active when
executing plans with an increased risk. Since both the robot
and the operator are aware about each other’s state, they can
agree on some operation where the robot can run at a higher
speed while the operator understands what is safe or not and
do not modify the agreed plan even if the operator can.
Including deliberation in planning and acting mode in our
use case will make a difference in the risk reduction. For
coordination operations, the deliberation mode will make the
collaboration more efficient, since the operator and the robot
are fully aware of each other’s state and will deliberate in
case they diverge from the plan. The risk of colliding with
each other, as in hazard 2 and 3, becomes much lower as
well due to the continuous synchronization of sequences in
the deliberation moments. For hazards 4 and 5, the operator
will not initiate a change in the sequence as without deliberate
with the robot. The operator is also highly trained to know
what actions that can not be taken without violating the plan
[21].
VI. CONCLUSION
In final assembly, where the environment is crowded and
the process is complex, flexibility is a must when automating.
By flexible automation we mean that the system must have a
high degree of adaptation in order to handle the change over,
both in volume variations, product and resource variability as
well as to adjust production in time where we do not need to
reprogram or re-validate after each change.
Apparently the balance between achieving flexible and
economically sustainable automation solutions while ensuring
safe interaction between the human and the robot system is
challenging. The current collaboration methods for Human-
robot collaboration application design given by the harmonized
standards are much similar to traditional automation and
do not support implementation of intelligent and adaptive
collaborative system in complex application. Therefore it is
necessary to rethink safety and collaborative operation modes
to enable the vision of working collaboratively with cobots
and regarding them as truly co-workers.
For our study we have chosen a final assembly station and
transformed it into an intelligent and collaborative station in
several steps. In this paper, we have introduced the applicable
standards and specifications for this type of automation. We
have described the conducted risk assessment including possi-
ble risk reduction measures where we discussed the difficulty
to include intelligence and maintain efficiency while meeting
safety requirements. Based on the use case we have identified
the need of a new collaborative method for deliberative and
adaptive system where robot system and operator plan, delib-
erate, adapt and act together. This is important when updating
future standards in the future. A prerequisite for this mode is
a skilled operator with greater responsibility and experience,
an intelligent and adaptive control system that can keep track
of the current status in the application including the human,
enabling smart algorithm and path planning as well as a robust
communication.
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